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I. INTRODUCTION
"[W]hat I really want to do is reach in, rip out their heart, and eat it
before they die."
-Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Lehman Brothers, Chief
Executive Officer (1994-2008), in reference
to investors short selling Lehman Brothers stock.
Controversy surrounding short selling is not a recent phenomenon.
Two firsts came at the turn of the seventeenth century: the first company
in modern times to sell shares of its stock to the general public, and with
it, the first short-selling dispute.2 Roughly 400 years before Richard
Fuld not so subtly expressed his disfavor towards short sellers, the
Dutch East India Company was created as a monopoly to facilitate trade
between the Dutch and the East.' Seven years later, in 1609, one of the
company's original shareholders considered the share price overvalued
1. J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami School of Law; M.B.A. 2009 University of
Miami School of Business; B.A. 2006, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank my
faculty advisor, Stephen Halpert, for his guidance during my research. Additionally, I am grateful
to Jessica Johnson and the University of Miami Law Review for their feedback during the editing
process. A special thank you to my family and friends for their support. Most importantly, this
Comment is dedicated to my wife and best friend, Danielle.
2. Chinmay Jain et al., A Comparative Analysis of Short Selling Restrictions 7 (Jan. 2012),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1928730.
3. Henk Rijkeboer, History of the Dutch East India Company - The Asian Part, EUROPEAN-
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after learning about the planned incorporation of a competing French
trading firm.4 The shareholder formed an association to short shares of
the Dutch East India Company.' The company's stock price declined
twelve percent over the following year, and the short sellers earned sig-
nificant profits.' The other shareholders, angered upon learning about
the short sellers' investment strategy, petitioned the Amsterdam
Exchange to address the situation. In 1610, the first short-selling regula-
tions were enacted: short selling was prohibited on the exchange.'
Corporate managers contend that short sales depress stock prices;
academics argue that short sales play an essential role in the pursuit of
efficient markets; and regulators continually grapple with their own con-
flicting views about short sales. This comment explores existing empiri-
cal research and concludes that short sales are an important investment
vehicle that benefit the financial markets, primarily by increasing the
flow of information and improving market efficiency.
The first Part of this comment provides a short-selling primer. Part
II explains some of the risks and uncertainties associated with short
sales. Next, Part III details the benefits brokerage firms gain from facili-
tating short sales. A deeper analysis in Part IV explores empirical data
and addresses whether there is a social interest in protecting short sales.
Finally, Part V proposes regulatory changes that may promote more
informed short selling.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO SHORT SALES
A short seller will earn money if the price of the stock in which he
invests declines.' At the most basic level, a short sale transaction oper-
ates as follows: First, an investor borrows from a lender the shares of a
stock he intends to short and sells the shares on the open market at point
A. When the investor wishes to close out the short sale, he buys back the
shares of the stock on the open market at point B and delivers the pur-
chased shares back to the stock lender. Excluding transaction costs, the
HERITAGE, http://www.european-heritage.org/netherlands/alkmaar/history-dutch-east-india-compa
ny-asian-part (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
4. Arturo Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and the Market Around the World




7. Jain et al., supra note 2, at 1.
8. The opposite of going "short" in a stock is to go "long" in a stock. An investor that is long
in a stock will earn money if the price of the stock increases. Long (or Long Position),
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.comLtenns/l1/ong.asp#axzz2KUrHCCNA (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013).
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investor will earn money if the price of the stock at point B is lower than
the price of the stock at point A.
Inserting numbers into the illustration presents us with the follow-
ing. Assume that the investor wants to short sell 200 shares of Stock
XYZ, which is trading at $50 per share at point A. At point A, the inves-
tor will borrow 200 shares of XYZ from a lender and sell those shares
on the open market and earn $10,000 in cash (200 shares multiplied by
$50 per share). Then, the investor will close out his short position at
point B. At point B, XYZ has declined in value to $40 per share. The
investor must purchase 200 shares of XYZ and deliver those shares back
to the lender. Repurchasing 200 shares of XYZ at point B will cost the
investor $8,000 (200 shares multiplied by $40 per share). The short
seller earns $2,000 from this investment-$ 10,000 at point A when he
sells the borrowed shares minus $8,000 to repurchase the shares at point
B.
The illustration above conveys the basic mechanics of a short-sale
transaction. In practice, short selling is a strictly regulated investment
strategy that involves multiple parties.
Before an individual investor can conduct a short sale, he must
open a margin account with a brokerage firm.' Margin trading occurs
when an investor borrows funds from a broker to complete a transac-
tion.10 The portion of the purchase price that the investor is required to
deposit into the margin account is called "margin." The margin is the
investor's initial equity in the account." Federal Reserve Board Regula-
tion T mandates that an investor deposit fifty percent of the total
purchase price of each new stock in the margin account. 12 In addition to
the fifty percent "initial" margin requirement, the margin trading regula-
tions also contain a "maintenance" margin requirement. The Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA")13 requires that an investor's
equity in the account stay above twenty-five percent "of the current mar-
9. An alternative type of brokerage account is a "cash" account. An investor funds 100
percent of the cash account with his own capital. Short selling is not permitted in a cash account.
Cash Account, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cashaccount.asp#axzz2
KUrHCCNA (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
10. Margin: Borrowing Money To Pay for Stocks, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/margin.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
11. Purchasing on Margin, Risks Involved With Trading in a Margin Account, FINRA.ORG,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/Smartlnvesting/Advancedlnvesting/Marginlnformation/P005927
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
12. 12 CFR § 220.12 (2012).
13. The SEC delegated authority to FINRA, as a Self-Regulatory Organization, to oversee
brokerage firms. "FINRA is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing
business in the United States. FINRA's mission is to protect America's investors by making sure
the securities industry operates fairly and honestly. All told, FINRA oversees about 4,290
brokerage firms, about 161,265 branch offices and approximately 630,390 registered securities
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ket value of the securities in the account."l 4 Individual brokerage firms
have the right to set maintenance margin requirements above twenty-
five percent; and additionally, may raise their maintenance margin
requirements for an account at any time. 15
These regulations are detailed in a margin disclosure agreement
provided by the broker to the investor before a margin account can be
opened. The margin disclosure agreement explains some of the risks that
are involved with margin trading.16 The following section outlines a
number of the risks of short selling and concludes with an in-depth look
at one of the major risks a short seller faces: the short squeeze.
III. SHORT SALE RISKS
A. Market Risks: The Margin Call
The monetary risk of short selling is theoretically unlimited. There
is no upper bound to the price of a stock, and as the stock price rises, the
short seller's losses rise with it." Many brokerage firms have margin
maintenance requirements between thirty and forty percent." Therefore,
as the price of the stock increases, the likelihood of a margin call
increases as well. A margin call occurs when the investor's equity in the
margin account falls below the margin maintenance requirement. To
illustrate this, we can use the same figures as above and assume a mar-
gin account with only one security in it, XYZ. The investor wants to
short sell 200 shares of XYZ, and XYZ is trading at $50 per share at
point A. Per Regulation T, the investor will be required to deposit
$5,000 of equity into the margin account (50% multiplied by (200 shares
multiplied by $50 per share)). Assuming the brokerage's margin mainte-
nance requirement is forty percent, if the price of XYZ increases from
$50 per share to $55 per share, the investor will be subject to a margin
call. The call is triggered because the cost to cover the short position
increases from $10,000 (200 shares x $50 per share) to $11,000 (200
shares x $55 per share). The $1,000 increase in the cost to cover the
representatives." About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra
.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
14. Purchasing on Margin, Risks Involved With Trading in a Margin Account, FINRA.ORG,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/Smartlnvesting/Advancedlnvesting/Marginlnformation/P005927
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
15. Id.
16. Margin Disclosure Statement, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/
@inv/@smart/@advanc/documents/investors/p005895.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
17. Patricia M. Dechow et al., Short Sellers, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock Returns 3
(May 1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=167154. Conversely,
the upside is limited. The price of a stock can only go as far down as $0.00 per share. Id.
18. Margin: Borrowing Money To Pay for Stocks, SEc.Gov, http://www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/margin.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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short position adjusts the investor's equity in the account downward by
$1,000 to $4,000. The adjusted margin percentage would be thirty-six
percent ($4000 equity / $11,000 cost to cover).
Once the investor falls below the margin maintenance requirement,
he will have to satisfy the margin call, which may occur in multiple
ways. The investor may be forced to close out the transaction by repur-
chasing the shares on the open market at the increased price-in the
above example, at a $1,000 loss. Alternatively, the investor may be able
to meet the margin call by depositing additional equity into the account
to meet the forty percent maintenance margin requirement. Or, the bro-
kerage firm may force the sale of other securities in the margin account
to cover the deficiency.19 As part of the margin disclosure agreement the
investor agrees that the brokerage firm has the right to liquidate the
securities without ever contacting the investor. The investor does not
have the right to select which securities in the margin account are liqui-
dated to meet the margin call.2 0 Because the securities in the account act
as collateral for the margin loan, the brokerage firm has the right to
protect its interest as a lender and choose whichever securities it deems
prudent for liquidatation. 2 ' The brokerage firm may also increase its
maintenance margin requirement at any time without prior notice to the
investor, and the investor does not have a right to a time extension on a
margin call.22
As demonstrated, margin trading affords an investor greater
purchasing power through leverage; however, it also exposes the inves-
tor to greater risks. The next section discusses another risk of short sell-
ing: recall risk.
B. Recall Risk
Brokerage firms hold their margin account holders' securities in
"street name." This means that the brokerage firm will hold the certifi-
cates for any securities purchased and the brokerage firm will appear as
the owner of the security on the issuer's books.23 Although the investor
is the "beneficial" owner of the securities, the brokerage firm possesses
19. Margin Disclosure Statement, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/@
inv/@smart/@advanc/documents/investors/p005895.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
20. Id. ("Most firms will attempt to notify their customers of margin calls, but they are not
required to do so. However, even if a firm has contacted a customer and provided a specific date
by which the customer can meet a margin call, the firm can still take necessary steps to protect its
financial interests, including immediately selling the securities without notice to the customer.").
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Holding Your Securities - Get the Facts, SEc.Gov, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
holdsec.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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the right to lend its clients' securities to other investors.2 4 Brokerage
firms accumulate all the securities of their margin accounts into a fungi-
ble mass. Then, when a margin client wants to short a particular stock,
the brokerage firm will lend the client the stock from the accumulated
mass.25
The short seller is exposed to the risk that a margin account holder
will request that his shares be delivered back to him in order to close out
his long position or to transfer his shares to a cash account. 2 6 Accord-
ingly, the broker reserves the right to recall the loaned shares at any
time.27 If the shares are recalled and the broker is unable to locate alter-
native shares to lend to the short seller, the short seller must close out
the short position by purchasing the required shares on the open mar-
ket. 28 This exposes the short seller to the possibility of closing the posi-
tion at a significant loss. 29
Section VII examines broker disclosures that may provide short
sellers a better opportunity to predict the possibility of recall. Margin
call and recall risk are functionally linked with the largest economic risk
facing short sellers-the risk of a short squeeze.
C. Short Squeeze Risk
Less than half a year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers"0 and
the government bailout of the insurance giant AIG, 1 financial stocks
were languishing and Citigroup was "arguably the weakest of the
bunch."32 However, over a short period between March and April of
2009, shares of Citigroup increased over three hundred percent.
Months earlier, amidst the collapsing financial sector and the sharp
decline of the global markets, one company emerged temporarily as the
24. E.g., E*Trade Securities Brokerage Customer Agreement, ETRADE, https://us.etrade.com/
e/t/estation/help?id=1209031000 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
25. Robert C. Apfel et al., Short Sales, Damages, and Class Certification in l0b-5 Cases 17
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8618, 2001).
26. See Owen A. Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms 4 (Nat'1 Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10659, 2004).
27. Id. at 3.
28. Ekkehart Boehmer, Which Shorts are Informed?, 63 J. FINANCE 491, 523 (2008).
29. Id.
30. Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy, Scrambles to Sell Key Businesses, CNBC (Sep.
15, 2008), http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708143.
31. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Authorizing AIG
Bailout (Sep. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/
20080916a.htm.
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most valuable company in the world." On October 28, 2008, shares of
Volkswagen peaked at over £1,005 per share." Volkswagen's shares
spiked by one hundred forty-seven percent in one day, and then
increased by eighty-two percent the day after.3
Although Citigroup was a global banking leader and Volkswagen
owned a strong line of automotive brands, these excessive gains could
not be explained by the underlying fundamentals of the stocks. These
two, not particularly rare, events were classic examples of a short
squeeze. A short squeeze is generally triggered by the upward move-
ment of a stock, combined with the effects of margin calls and recalls, or
simply the fear of possible margin calls and recalls.
Because a short seller has an outstanding obligation to deliver the
shares he borrowed back to the lender, if the price of a shorted stock
begins to rise, a few things may happen. First, the short seller may
believe the stock will continue its upward momentum and to minimize
his losses he will quickly cover his short sale by purchasing shares on
the open market and delivering them back to the lender. As short sellers
close out their positions, upward pressure is pushed onto the stock
price." Second, the short seller may be subject to a margin call, because
as the stock price increases, the investor's equity in his margin account
and his margin maintenance ratio decrease. A margin call often leads to
a forced close out of the short position-the shorted stock faces more
upward pressure." Third, long investors interested in purchasing the
stock as its price rises will add to the upward pressure on the stock.
34. Squeezy Money, EcONOMIST (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12523898.
35. Id.
36. Wei Xu & Baixiao Liu, Short Squeezes 3 (Nov. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2019361.
37. Other prominent short squeeze instances include the internet companies Yelp, Overstock
and Amazon. On August 29, 2012 shares of Yelp increased by 23% when investors that bet
against the company scrambled to close out their short positions when they realized that the end of
Yelp's "lockup" period was not going to damage the stock. Steven Russolillo & David Benoit,
Short Sellers Cry Out for Yelp, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
0872396390444914904577619441077234120.html. On February 17, 2004, Overstock's CEO
spent $13 million on the open market purchasing 620,000 shares of Overstock's stock. This
triggered a short squeeze, causing a 16% increase in Overstock's stock in one day. Justin Lahart,
Outside Audit: Overstock's Short Sellers May Have Overdone It, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2004,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB107904533621853135.html. In June of 1998, Amazon announced
a stock split. The share price jumped up in part because short sellers rushed to cover their
positions because at the time Amazon's short interest neared its entire float. Dechow et al., supra
note 17, at 4.
38. Matt Krantz, Ask Matt: 'Short Squeeze' Can Cause Big Investor Pain, USATODAY (May
27, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/krantzl2013/05/27/short-squeeze-
telsa/2151663/.
39. Lamont, supra note 26, at 26.
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Operatively, these three events build upon each other and the result is a
sharp rise in prices: a short squeeze.
How did the short sellers of Citigroup and Volkswagen fall victim
to their respective short squeezes? In March 2009, Citigroup announced
a plan to "convert its publicly listed preferred shares into common
stock."40 Because Citigroup was offering favorable conversion terms to
its preferred shareholders," investors rushed to sell short the common
shares,4 2 while concurrently purchasing the preferred shares.43 This arbi-
trage opportunity backfired on the short sellers. Citigroup delayed filing
documents with the SEC outlining its conversion plan," and it became
evident that the conversion rate would not be the same for all inves-
tors.45 As a result, many short sellers began to close their position,
which put upward pressure on Citigroup's stock price.4 6 At the same
time, shares of Citigroup were becoming more difficult to borrow
because of the low stock price4 7 and the high "short interest," which
represents the number of shares of a company that are sold short and not
yet covered.48 ,4 9 These factors led to more short sellers scrambling to
cover their positions, perpetuating the short squeeze.
The Volkswagen short squeeze was triggered by the news con-
40. David Enrich & John Jannarone, Citi Prolongs 'Squeeze,' and NYSE Isn't Helping, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123973914621017953.html.
41. Andrew Bary, Heavy Short Covering Boosts Citi Shares, BARRONS (Mar. 18, 2009), http:/
/online.barrons.com/article/SB123739146137172035.html ("Citi announced an exchange offer
involving some $25 billion of preferred held by the government under the TARP program, some
$12.5 billion of preferred held by a group of private investors, including Saudi Prince Alaweed,
and $14.9 billion of publicly held preferred.").
42. Weisenthal, supra note 32.
43. Susan Pulliam & Jenny Strasburg, Citi's Rally Undermines Hedge Funds' Trading Tack,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl23741964887878187.html.
44. Id.
45. Weisenthal, supra note 32.
46. Pulliam & Strasburg, supra note 43.
47. See Harlan D. Platt, A Fuller Theory of Short Selling, 5 J. ASSET MGMT. 49, 53 (2004)
("When a security's price falls below a certain threshold, the brokerage firm may restrict future
short sales, even if the security is held at the firm, because the firm reclassifies the security as
nonmarginable. Some brokerage firms, depending on the individual firm's policy, remove from
their marginable-security list equities whose prices have fallen below either $5 dollars or $2
dollars per share. Moreover, some securities firms require investors to repurchase shares
previously sold short if the price falls below their marginable level. Both rules make it difficult to
short sell shares of low-priced securities." Shares of Citigroup were trading below $5.00 at the
time.).
48. Id.
49. Definition of "Short Interest", INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
shortinterest.asp#axzz2liaLzAnA, (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) ("Short interest is a market-
sentiment indicator that tells whether investors think a stock's price is likely to fall. Short interest
can also be compared over time to examine changes in investor sentiment. Investors use short
interest to make predictions about the direction a particular stock is headed, and to measure the
bullishness or bearishness of investors' sentiment towards the market as a whole.").
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tained in a press release entitled, "Porsche Heads for Domination Agree-
ment." Porsche announced that it had accumulated 74.1% of the shares
of Volkswagen.o The German state Lower Saxony owned twenty per-
cent of the shares of Volkswagen and indicated that they were not will-
ing to sell their shares.51 Therefore, the amount of Volkswagen's shares
available for trading-the "float"-was only six percent.5 2 At that point
in time, the percentage of tradable shares outstanding was 12.8%, more
than double the float." Porsche's announcement caused the stock price
to increase and short sellers scrambled to cover their positions. The
result was an extreme short squeeze that made Volkswagen the most
valuable company in the world for a short period of time. As a result,
multiple hedge funds that had short positions with Volkswagen are cur-
rently in litigation with Porsche for alleged stock manipulation.54 The
plaintiffs allege that while Porsche was secretly accumulating shares, it
publicly concealed its Volkswagen takeover plans, as well as directly
assured the funds that it was only looking for a "slight, simple majority"
of Volkswagen shares." It was reported that Porsche earned over £30
billion from the short squeeze.5 6
After a short squeeze, the stock price often moves back down closer
to its fundamental value. For example, Volkswagen's stock price
declined forty-five percent after it hit its peak." However, for a short
seller that is often too late. Brokerage firms mark to market the value of
their clients' margin accounts on a daily basis, so many clients will face
a margin call long before the stock price reverts closer to its pre-short
squeeze level, losing large amounts of money in a matter of minutes.
The mechanics of margin trading is why a short squeeze poses such a
high risk to short sellers.
Section VII proposes ways the SEC and other regulatory bodies can
mitigate some of the risks of short sales. These proposals focus on the
50. Press Release, Porsche SE, Porsche Heads for Domination Agreement (Oct. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.porsche-se.com/pho/en/press/newsarchive2008/?pool=pho%20%20&id=
2008-10-26 (stating additionally, "Porsche has decided to make this announcement after it became
clear that there are by far more short positions in the market than expected. The disclosure should
give so called short sellers - meaning financial institutions which have betted or are still betting on
a falling share price in Volkswagen - the opportunity to settle their relevant positions without rush
and without facing major risks").
51. Floyd Norris, Reinventing the Short Squeeze, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 2008, at 11.
52. Xu & Liu, supra note 36, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
55. Julie Triedman, In Morrison's Wake, Hedge Funds Battle to Maintain Case Against
Porsche, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (ONLINE), Nov. 29, 2012, http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=
1202579853221.
56. Supra note 34.
57. Xu & Liu, supra note 36, at 3.
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regulations of issuing firms and brokerage firms. The following section
focuses on the benefits that brokerage firms receive from facilitating
short sales.
IV. BENEFITS TO THE BROKERAGE FIRM
Short-sale investments carry risk not only for the investor, but also
for the brokerage firm. As such, brokerage firms require compensation
in return for facilitating short sales. Of relevance to this article, the com-
pensation takes the form of trading commissions, margin interest, and
securities lending revenue. These are significant profit centers for bro-
kerage firms.
Short sellers, on a per investor basis, are larger clients to brokerage
firms than long-only investors.58 According to a 2012 report, short sell-
ers executed over four times as many stock trades over a six-year period
than long-only investors.59 Brokerage firms classify their traders as
active or non-active traders. While twenty-six percent of retail short sell-
ers are classified as active traders, only five percent of long-only inves-
tors are classified as active traders.6 0 Additionally, the average market
value of short sellers' accounts is more than double that of long-only
investors. 6' Likewise, the average trade size of short sellers is also larger
than the average trade size of long-only investors.62
Brokerages benefit greatly from active traders. The more trades a
client makes, the more revenue the brokerage firm earns in the form of
commissions. The ten largest discount brokerage firms earned, on aver-
age, a $7.96 per-trade commission in 2012.63 The reported commission
per trade' ranged from $4.95 to $9.99.65 Commissions and other per-
trade transaction fees make up a significant portion of discount broker-
age firms' annual revenues. For example, TD Ameritrade, E*Trade, and
Charles Schwab's commissions as a percentage of total net revenue were
forty-five, twenty-one, and twenty percent respectively in 2011.66
58. Keith Jacks Gamble & Wei Xu, Informed Retail Investors: Evidence from Retail Shorts 8
(Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919885.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. ("The average value of short sellers' stock holdings is $95,967 while the average value
of the long-only investors' stock holdings is $43,286.").
62. Id.
63. J. Alex Tarquinio, Best and Worst Brokers of 2012, SMARTMONEY (May 16, 2012), http:/
/www.smartmoney.com/invest/markets/smartmoneys-annual-broker-survey-23119/. This is down
from $8.27 per trade in 2011.
64. Commission on a 100-share trade at $20 per share. Id.
65. Id.
66. TD Ameritrade 2012 Form 10-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1173431/000119312512480655/d413018dl0k.htm#toc413018_12; E*Trade Fin. Corp. 2012
Form 10-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal015780/000119312512075584/
[Vol. 68:821830
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Because short sellers, on average, are more active traders than long-only
investors, their accounts generate more income for brokerage firms.
Additionally, short sellers tend to close out their transactions at a rapid
pace, which allows brokerage firms to earn in a short timeframe com-
missions on both the original sale of the borrowed shares and the subse-
quent repurchase of the shares.
Another significant profit source for brokerage firms is interest rev-
enue. Interest revenue derives from both margin lending and securities
lending-two activities made possible by margin account holders. A
short seller must pay margin interest on the value of the funds he bor-
rows to execute his trade. The average margin interest rate is approxi-
mately 7.15%.67 This is not a cheap source of financing for the investor;
by comparison, this rate is roughly 350 basis points higher than current
thirty-year fixed mortgage rates.68 Margin interest is based on the debit
balance in the margin account and is calculated and compounded daily
and charged monthly.69
Brokerage firms also generate income by participating in the secur-
ities lending market, acting as both securities lenders and securities bor-
rowers. When an investor opens a margin account, he agrees that the
brokerage firm may lend his shares to third parties.70 Also, if a short
seller's brokerage firm does not possess lendable shares of a security
that the short seller wants to borrow, the brokerage firm will attempt to
locate and borrow the shares from a third-party lender. When the broker-
age firm lends its clients' securities, the borrower deposits cash collat-
eral with the lender.71 The lender is able to reinvest this collateral and
generate income for the firm. 72 The lender will also pay a "rebate" to the
securities borrower. The borrower can be thought of as a lender of
d283628d10k.htm#toc283628_39; The Charles Schwab Corp. 2012 Form 10-K, available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/316709/000119312512077926/d264447dl0k.htm.
67. Based on a survey of five discount brokers, as reported on Feb. 10, 2013. E*Trade,
available at https://us.etrade.com/e/tlestation/pricing?id=1206010000; TD Ameritrade, available
at https://www.tdameritrade.com/pricing/margin-and-interest-rates.page; Scottrade, available at
https://advisor.scottrade.com/brokerage-services/margin-rates.aspx; Charles Schwab, available at
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/accounts-products/investment/margin-ac
counts; Fidelity, available at https://www.fidelity.com/trading/commissions-margin-rates.
68. 30 Year Fixed Rate Mortgage, Overnight Average as of Feb. 10, 2013, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/.
69. Trade on Margin, ETRADE.COM, https://us.etrade.com/e/t/estation/help?id=1302000000#
Understand3 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
70. E.g., TD Ameritrade Margin Handbook, at 14, available at https://www.tdameritrade
.con/retail-enus/resources/pdf/AMTDO86.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
71. Normally equal to 102% of the market value of the securities. Christopher Geczy et al.,
Stocks are Special Too: An Analysis of the Equity Lending Market, 66 J. FiN. EcoN. 241, 244
(2002).
72. E.g., supra, note 69. Individual investors are not entitled to any return on this investment.
Id.
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cash,7 3 and the rebate is the interest he earns on his loan.74 The rebate
rate will be below the market rate for cash, so this spread is considered
the "loan fee." The rebate rate is negatively correlated with the degree of
difficulty of locating the shares to borrow. If an investor seeks to borrow
"hard-to-borrow" shares he may receive "little or no rebate, or even a
negative rebate. In that instance, the borrower essentially pays the lender
a rental fee for the privilege of borrowing the scarce security."" Typi-
cally, "hard to borrow" shares have smaller capitalizations, smaller
floats, smaller institutional ownership, and are in higher demand for bor-
rowing.7 6 These factors are important to keep in mind while examining
regulations related to short sales because "hard-to-borrow" stocks pose
higher recall and short squeeze risks to short sellers. Brokerage firms
earn a significant portion of their income from margin lending and the
related securities lending business. For example, in 2012, TD Ameri-
trade reported that it generated seventeen percent of its total net revenue
by these activities."
V. Is THERE A SOCIAL INTEREST IN PROTECTING SHORT SALES?
Short sellers bet against the market. At an instinctual level, some-
thing seems wrong, even unpatriotic, about this practice. These instinc-
tually adverse feelings are reflected in the treatment of short sales
throughout history-ranging from criminalization," to outright bans,7 9
to partial bans,so and consistently throughout, strict regulations. Despite
these seemingly hostile views towards short sales, the bans are always
eventually lifted. Moreover, regulators, political leaders, and industry
73. Geczy et al., supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. Karin LaBarge, Securities Lending: Still No Free Lunch, VANGUARD (July 2011), https://
institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/ICRSL.pdf.
76. Lamont, supra note 26, at 4.
77. TD Ameritrade 2012 Form 10K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal
1173431/000119312512480655/d413018dl0k.htm#toc413018_12.
78. Napoleon Bonaparte considered short sales treasons and had short sellers imprisoned. As
recently as 1995, the Finance Ministry of Malaysia suggested that short sellers be punished by
caning. Short Selling: Marking the Ban, INVESTOPEDIA (July 11, 2009), available at http://www
.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/09/short-selling-ban.asp#axzz2JqrlaU00.
79. For example, Great Britain banned short selling in 1733 after the South Sea Company
collapsed. America banned short selling during the War of 1812. Id. Recently, Spain implemented
a ban on all short sales from July 2012 through January 2013. Sarah Jones, Spanish Stocks Drop
as Regulator Lifts Short-Selling Ban, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-02-01/spanish-stocks-drop-as-regulator-lifts-short-selling-ban.html.
80. The SEC banned short sales of financial stocks on September 19, 2008. Press Release,
SEC, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets, (Sep. 19,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211 .htm. The ban was lifted on
October 3, 2008. Press Release, SEC, SEC Statement Lifting the Ban (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-238.htm.
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insiders, whether in favor of or against short sales, all agree that there is
some role in the market for short sales. The question this comment
attempts to answer is what role short sales play in the market and
whether there is a social interest in providing greater protection for short
sales.
In response to a question about the SEC's temporary ban of short
sales of financial stocks in 2008, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
stated, "[k]nowing what we know now, I believe on balance the com-
mission would not do it again. The costs [of the short-selling ban on
financials] appear to outweigh the benefits."" Chairman Cox's state-
ment is overwhelmingly supported by the academic research on short
sales.82 The section below examines the empirical data surrounding
short sales. Research shows that short selling improves the market by
promoting the flow of information and improving market efficiency.
A. Increased Flow of Information
The following case study exemplifies how short sales can increase
the flow of socially beneficial information. On August 23, 2000, Enron's
stock price reached its record high of $90 per share. In February 2001,
Fortune Magazine named Enron the "Most Innovative Company in
America" for the sixth consecutive year.8 4 However, less then a year
later, on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 5 At
the height of Enron's market success, James Chanos, a professional
short seller, began scrutinizing Enron in October 2000,6 and he helped
bring to the forefront information that was instrumental in exposing one
of Wall Street's biggest scandals.
Chanos' interest in Enron first began when he learned that the firm
was using a "gain-on-sale" accounting method for its long-term energy
trades." As Chanos explained it, this accounting method "allows a com-
81. Alessandro Beber & Marco Pagano, Short Selling Bans Around the World 31 (Aug.
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502184.
82. See, e.g., Jap Efendi et al., Can Short Sellers Anticipate Accounting Restatements? 4 (July
20, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=591361; Pedro Saffi &
Kari Sigurdsson, Price Efficiency and Short Selling, 24 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 629, 822 (2011).
83. Enron Timeline, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2004, http://www.chron.com/business/enron/
article/Enron-timeline- 1 983775.php.
84. Bethany McClean, Why Enron Went Bust Start with Arrogance. Add Greed, Deceit, and
Financial Chicanery. What do you get? A company that wasn't what it was cracked up to be.,
CNNMONEY (Dec. 4, 2001), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2001/12/24/
315319/index.htm.
85. Supra note 83.
86. Developments Related to Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and
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pany to estimate the future profitability of a trade made today, and book
a profit today based on the present value of those estimated future prof-
its."" This is a concerning practice because aggressive managers can
fabricate "earnings" by using advantageous assumptions about the
trades.8 9 However, if these projections do not pan out, the company
using this accounting method would either have to adjust the previously
reported earnings downward, or simply do another deal with more
aggressive "earnings" assumptions to offset the downward
adjustments. 90
Chanos began short selling Enron stock in November 2000 after
analyzing Enron's 1999 Form 10-K filing.91 Chanos noticed that
Enron's return on capital, before taxes, was only seven percent. He
assumed that Enron's cost of capital was around nine percent; therefore,
despite reporting "profits," Enron was likely losing money.9 2 Chanos'
concerns about Enron continued to grow. In a sworn statement to the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chanos remarked:
We were also troubled by Enron's cryptic disclosure regarding vari-
ous "related party transactions" described in its 1999 Form 10-K as
well as the quarterly Form 10-Qs it filed with the SEC in 2000 for its
March, June and September quarters. We read the footnotes in
Enron's financial statements about these transactions over and over
again but could not decipher what impact they had on Enron's overall
financial condition. It did seem strange to us, however, that Enron
had organized these entities for the apparent purpose of trading with
their parent company, and that they were run by an Enron executive.
Another disturbing factor in our review of Enron's situation was what
we perceived to be the large amount of insider selling of Enron stock
by Enron's senior executives. While not damning by itself, such sell-
ing in conjunction with our other financial concerns added to our
conviction. 93
Over the next few months, unsettling information continued to flow out
of Enron. Multiple senior executives left the company, there was signifi-
cant insider selling of Enron stock, the 2000 Form 10-K showed contin-
ued low return on capital and also reflected a number of large one-time
gains that propped up Enron's earnings.9 4
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reported its first quarterly loss in four years-a loss of $618 million.
The SEC began an investigation into the "related party transactions" and
found that they were "a complex web of partnerships . . . designed to
hide Enron's debt."96 On December 2, 2001, Enron declared bankruptcy.
Enron's stock became valueless, about 5,600 Enron employees lost their
jobs," and investors lost billions of dollars. Chanos concluded his testi-
mony by stating, "[w]hile short sellers probably will never be popular on
Wall Street, they often are the ones wearing the white hats when it
comes to looking for and identifying the bad guys."98
Short selling provides an outlet for investors to express a pessimis-
tic view. Short interest data can serve as a proxy for negative sentiment
about a company. It is unrealistic to think that short selling can single-
handedly prevent corporate fraud, but short selling data is essential
information for the market. It is information that can help prevent inves-
tors from allocating their capital to unwise investments at inflated prices.
Additionally, it is information that regulators can use as a proverbial
canary in the coal of mine of corporate misconduct.
Although the Enron collapse was a front-page scandal, the funda-
mental mechanics that triggered the collapse were not unique. On a daily
basis, the information gleaned from short selling data plays an essential
role in the efficient functioning of the market. The usefulness of short
selling data does not stop with its ability to help root out corporate
fraud-a number of studies show that short sellers' holdings are predic-
tive of news announcements, unanticipated earning statements, and
stock returns.
In one study, researchers analyzed 565 firms that announced finan-
cial statement restatements due to "accounting irregularities" from 1995
to 2002. The study found that there was a "statistically significant" level
of short interest in the restating firms starting as far back as nineteen
months before the announcements.9 9 In the six months preceding the
announcements, the short interest level increased significantly and
peaked the month before the announcement. "0 Of particular interest, the
researchers separated the firms into three different categories based upon
the severity of the accounting irregularities. The results showed that the





99. Efendi et al., supra note 82, at 4.
100. Id. at 21.
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more severe the accounting irregularity, the greater the short interest
level was.'o
The authors of the study point out that this correlation between
short interest levels and accounting restatements can be particularly use-
ful to regulators in light of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.102 Section 404 "requires management and the external auditors to
report on the adequacy of the company's internal control over financial
reporting." 0 In a Staff Statement about Section 404, the SEC wrote:
An overall purpose of internal control over financial reporting is to
foster the preparation of reliable financial statements. Reliable finan-
cial statements must be materially accurate. Therefore, a central pur-
pose of the assessment of internal control over financial reporting is
to identify material weaknesses that have, as indicated by their very
definition, more than a remote likelihood of leading to a material mis-
statement in the financial statements. While identifying control defi-
ciencies and significant deficiencies represents an important
component of management's assessment, the overall focus of internal
control reporting should be on those items that could result in mate-
rial errors in the financial statement.104
Because short sale levels are predicative of accounting restatements, and
accounting restatements provide evidence of weak financial reporting
controls,o'0 the SEC can use this information as a useful tool. A study by
Jap Efendi and others recommends that auditors conduct more stringent
examinations of companies' accounting practices when short selling
levels are high.'
Short sellers' ability to make money is dependent on discovering
overpriced stocks. As discussed, they often achieve this by scrutinizing
financial statements and accounting reports to find mispricing.10 In this
respect, a short seller's incentives are aligned with the incentives of
financial regulators. Other industry players, upon whom the market
relies to illuminate information about public companies, may not pos-
sess the same incentives. For example, financial analysts may hesitate to
release negative news out of fear that corporate management will restrict
101. For example, the most severe accounting irregularities prompted SEC investigations. Id.
at 24.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Jiamin Wang, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Places Disproportionate Burden on Smaller
Public Companies 1 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/departments/
center-for-data-analysis/~/media/CDA/CDAfeatures/SOXCDAedited3.ashx.
104. SEC Staff Statement on Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/stafficreporting.htm.
105. Efendi et al., supra note 82, at 6.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 4.
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information access to them in the future.' Additionally, analysts are
supposed to report objective, unbiased analysis; however, many analysts
work for large institutions with investment banking and brokerage
departments that generally thrive on positive news.' 09
Paul Griffin of University of California Davis researched analyst
behavior surrounding corrective earnings disclosures that led to allega-
tions of securities fraud.o10 Griffin found that most analysts are reactive
to bad news, rather than able to predict bad news."' The majority of
analyst downgrades come after a firm releases a corrective disclosure.l12
Additionally, in the months following a corrective disclosure, the num-
ber of analysts covering those firms declines "significantly." Griffin
contends that this is because "analysts are less interested in following
companies with bad news."H 3 Interestingly, the study finds that short
sellers are "unusually active" in the months prior to a corrective disclo-
sure."' Analysts, despite this public information coming from short sell-
ers, "on average continue to issue optimistic forecasts until the event
and/or the price change apparently trigger an adjustment."' 1 James Cha-
nos understood the moral hazard that may drive the analyst behavior
studied by Griffin. Chanos stated in his testimony about Enron to the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
One analyst, while admitting that Enron was a "black box" regarding
profits, said that, as long as Enron delivered, who was he to argue! It
was clear to us that most of these analysts were hopelessly conflicted
over the investment banking and advisory fees that Enron was paying
to their firms. We took their "buy" recommendations, both current
and future, with a very large grain of salt!"'
The information contained in short sales is undoubtedly important to the
market.
B. Market Efficiency
In his 1975 book, The Citizens and the State, Essays on Regulation,
Nobel Prize-winning economist George Stigler stated, "[s]o far as the
efficiency and growth of the American economy are concerned, efficient
108. Paul A. Griffin, A League of Their Own? Financial Analysts' Responses to Restatements
and Corrective Disclosures 4 (Aug. 15, 2002), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=326581.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id. at ii.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Supra note 86.
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capital markets are even more important than the protection of inves-
tors-in fact efficient capital markets are the major protection of inves-
tors.""' Extensive empirical literature concludes that short sales
improve market efficiency. Efficiency is a broad term, but in the context
of this comment efficiency refers to price efficiency and lower transac-
tion costs.
Price efficiency can be defined as "the degree to which prices
reflect all . . . available information."" The primary measure of price
efficiency is the speed at which prices reflect the available informa-
tion.119 Arturo Bris and Ning Zhu studied the effects of short sales on
the speed of price discovery across forty-six different countries. 12 0 Bris
and Zhu grouped the countries into four categories: countries where
short selling was allowed before and throughout their research; countries
where short sales were prohibited throughout their research; countries
where short selling was allowed, but rarely used; and countries where
short-sale regulations and practices changed during the course of their
research.12 ' Their cross-market research showed that constraints to short
sales decreased the speed at which information is incorporated into stock
prices. They concluded, "[m]arkets where short sales are allowed are
more efficient because bad news appears to be more rapidly impounded
into prices." 2 2
In a similar multi-country study, Pedro Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson
also examined the effects of short sale constraints on the speed at which
prices reflect available information. 12 3 Saffi's and Sigurdsson's dataset
consisted of stocks from thirty-one different countries.1 24 The research-
ers used the supply of lendable shares and loan fees as proxies for short
sale constraints. 125 The lower the lending supply and the higher the loan
fees, the greater the constraints on the short sale. 12 6 Saffi and Sigurdsson
concluded that stocks with greater short sale constraints possessed
diminished price efficiency. 127 A result of inefficient price discovery is
that current market information only gradually flows into prices of the
short sale-constrained stocks. 128
117. GEORGE STIGLER, THE CITIZENS AND THE STATE, ESSAYS ON REGULATION 88 (1975).
118. Saffi & Sigurdsson, supra note 82, at 822.
119. Id.
120. Bris et al., supra note 4, at 10.
121. Id. at 13-14.
122. Id. at 28.
123. Saffi & Sigurdsson, supra note 82, at 822.
124. Id. at 829.
125. Id. at 824.
126. Id. at 829.
127. Id. at 849.
128. Id. at 827.
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Consistent with the findings above, additional research has shown
that short sales help move share prices to levels in congruence with the
underlying fundamentals of the stock. 1 29 By doing so, this decreases the
number of investors that buy or sell at prices "not in accord with under-
lying economic realities."1 30 For example, research shows that when
short sales are constrained, pessimistic investors are unable to participate
in the market. 13 1 This leads share prices to be "biased upward" because
the only valuations that are reflected are those of the more optimistic,
unconstrained, long investors.132 Former SEC Chairman Christopher
Cox stated in July 2008, "we need the shorts in the market for balance so
that we don't have bubbles."13 3
Some economists have theorized that the overpricing of Internet
stocks in the late 1990s was due in part to short-sale constraints. 134 In a
2001 article for the National Bureau of Economic Research, two New
York University economists studied 400 Internet stocks and their char-
acteristics during the period of January 1, 1998 to February 29, 2000.135
Unsurprisingly, given the highly publicized nature of the Internet "bub-
ble" and subsequent crash, the economists found that the Internet stocks
were trading at prices that exceeded their fundamentals. The weighted
average price-to-earnings ratio of the 400 companies was 605.136 In
comparison, the price to earnings ratios of Google and eBay-two
Internet stocks-at the end of 2012 were 21.89 and 25.63, respec-
tively.'3 7 One could argue that the price-to-earnings ratio is a misleading
metric because investors during the dotcom boom were investing based
on potential future earnings of startup companies, not current earnings.
However, to impute a price-to-earnings ratio of 20, "the internet sector
would need to generate 40.6% excess returns for a 10-year period."s38 In
129. Douglas M. Branson, Nibbling at the Edges - Regulation of Short Selling: Policing
Failures to Deliver and Restoration of an Uptick Rule 11 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Working Paper No. 2009-23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456440.
130. Id.
131. Edward M. Miller, Risk Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. OF FIN. 1151, 1161
(1977).
132. Id.
133. Bradley Ziff & Carey Hsu, The Effects Of Short Selling Public Disclosure Of Individual
Positions On Equity Markets 25 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/pdf-files/
OWENFSPubl_2011 Short_- SellingPublicDisclosureEquityMarkets.pdf.
134. See, e.g., Geczy et al., supra note 71, at 242; Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, DotCom
Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stocks 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
8630, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8630.
135. Ofek & Richardson, supra note 134, at 9.
136. Id. at 14.
137. Google PE Ratio, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/GOOG/pe-ratio (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013); EBay PE Ratio, YCHARTs, http://ycharts.com/companies/EBAY/pe-ratio (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013).
138. Ofek and Richardson, supra note 134, at 14.
2014] 839
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
support of their theory that short-sale constraints played a role in the
Internet bubble, Ofek's and Richardson's research showed that Internet
stocks were more difficult to short because of high loan fees and low
lending supply.13 9
An article published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
points out that as we saw with the Internet bubble, market forces will
likely correct the mispricing of stocks in the long run, but in the short-
term, capital will continue to flow into overpriced stocks and their
underlying corporations.' 4 0 This misallocation generates social costs that
extend beyond simply diminished shareholder equity.' The parties
involved with these corporations-the "employees, customers, suppli-
ers, and lenders"-were directly affected by the market correction and
the subsequent failures of many of the corporations. 14 2 These conse-
quences trickled down into the overall economy.
Another factor used to determine whether a market is efficient is
the transaction costs associated with trading in that market. Academic
literature suggests that when constraints to short sales are reduced, trans-
action costs decrease. 143 One reason for this is that short selling
increases the number of potential sellers in the market." As a result,
this makes the completion of trades more likely because there is more
liquidity in the market.145 As liquidity increases, the transaction costs of
trading decreases, which leads to increased efficiency.146
Researchers have been able to use short sale bans from around the
world as a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. From September
19, 2008 to October 8, 2008, the SEC banned short selling in financial
companies.' 47 In the same article published by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York previously discussed, the authors studied the empirical
data related to this ban.'48 They estimated that during the period of the
ban, transaction costs in the equities option market increased by $500
million. 149
A similar study from 2009 found that the relative bid-ask spreads of
139. Id. at 26-27.
140. Robert Battalio et al., Market Declines: What is Accomplished by Banning Short Selling?
18 CURRENT ISSUES IN EcoNs. & FIN. 1, 2 (2012).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Seraina Gruenewal, Short Selling Regulation After the Financial Crisis-First Principles








GOING LONG ON SHORTS
the banned stocks increased by thirty-two basis points, on average.150
The economists that conducted the study estimated that the increase in
bid-ask spreads caused an increase in transaction costs in the equity mar-
ket of more than $600 million.'"' Additionally, these actual costs do not
account for the costs of "mutually beneficial trades that did not occur
because of the inflated liquidity costs."1 5 2
From 2007 to 2009, regulators around the world implemented some
form of constraints or bans on short selling. 53 Beber and Pagano
examined the effects of these bans on liquidity in thirty countries.154
Using bid-ask spreads as a proxy for liquidity, the researchers found that
the constraints and bans led to "statistically significant" increases in bid-
ask spreads-negatively affecting liquidity.'15  This in turn, slowed
down price discovery. 156 The negative consequences of short-sale bans
were not limited to the United States. On September 18, 2008, the
Financial Services Authority-Britain's equivalent of the SEC-initi-
ated a ban on short selling of financial stocks." Ian Marsh and Richard
Payne examined the effects. The results of their research were consistent
to what was observed in the United States. They concluded:
Once the ban was enacted differences become very apparent: liquid-
ity drains from the order book for financials to a much larger extent
than for non-financials; transactions costs for small and large trades
increase much more dramatically and trading volumes fall much
more dramatically for financials than non-financials; and our mea-
sures suggest that market quality deteriorated much more for
financials than non-financials. None of these moves would appear to
be in line with the objectives of regulators.1 ss
VI. REGULATORY ISSUES
In a 2010 Final Rule the SEC wrote, "we recognize the benefits to
the market of legitimate short selling, such as the provision of liquidity
and price efficiency." Regulators currently agree with the empirical data
that short sales are a critical component of the financial markets. The
question, therefore, is what regulatory changes can be implemented to
reduce some of the risks and uncertainties that are associated with short
150. The bid-ask spread often serves as a proxy for liquidity. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id. at 6.
153. Beber & Pagano, supra note 81, at 3.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 21.
156. Id. at 4.
157. Ian Marsh & Richard Payne, Banning Short Sales and Market Quality: The UK's
Experience 2 (July 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1645847.
158. Id. at 4.
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sales? In answering this question, this comment focuses on regulations
of both issuers and brokerage firms. There is evidence of issuers using
manipulative corporate strategies to battle short sellers. The next section
details these strategies and suggests ways regulators can minimize these
corporate tactics. The section thereafter suggests additional information
brokerage firms can disclose to investors to help reduce some of the
uncertainty associated with short sales.15 9
A. Issuer Share Repurchases
Like short sales, issuer-share repurchases is a controversial prac-
tice. Share repurchases, or stock buybacks, is when a public company
uses its cash to buy back its own shares.1 60 Generally, the company
repurchases the shares on the open market. To facilitate the discussion of
why repurchases pose a risk to short sales and whether they should be
more closely regulated to ensure market efficiency, it is necessary to
take a brief look at the data surrounding the efficacy and the social costs
and benefits of share repurchases.
In a letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders in 2000, Warren
Buffett wrote,
There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a
company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available
funds-cash plus sensible borrowing capacity-beyond the near-
term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the
market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. 16 '
159. There are currently two primary regulatory constraints to short selling: the ban on "naked"
short selling and the "alternative uptick rule." This Comment does not propose any changes to
these regulations, but they are briefly described here. When a short seller does not borrow, or
arrange to borrow, the shares he plans to short sell in time to make delivery to the buyer within the
required settlement period of three days this is considered a naked short sale. Naked short selling
is a violation of Rule 203 of Regulation SHO and can result in disgorgement and penalties. SEC
Division of Market Regulation, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Regulation
SHO, SEC.Gov (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregshol204.htm;
See Press Release, SEC, Short Selling Brothers Agree to Pay $14.5 Million to Settle SEC Charges
(Jul. 17, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-137.htm. In 2010, the SEC
amended Rule 201 of Regulation SHO to include what is known as the "alternative uptick rule."
Final Rule Amending Rule 201 of Regulation SHO, Release No. 34-61595, available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/34-61595.pdf. Under the rule, if a stock price declines by ten
percent or more in a single day a circuit breaker kicks in and short sales of that stock are
prohibited until the following trading day. Id. at 1. The SEC's stated purpose for this rule is to
"prevent short sellers from using short selling as a tool to exacerbate a declining market in a
security." Id. at 45.
160. Definition of "Share Repurchase, " INVESTOPEDA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
sharerepurchase.asp#axzz2Je3ZaGBh (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
161. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Board of Berkshire Hathaway, to Berkshire
Hathaway Shareholders (Mar. 1, 2000), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
1999htm.html.
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Optimized capital allocation is essential for efficient markets. Capital is
optimally allocated when investors purchase stocks that are trading at
prices close to their fundamental value and when corporate managers
make investment decisions that promote the long-term growth of their
companies. Empirical data suggests that share repurchase programs fail
to meet either of these two objectives.1 6 2
Share repurchases has been a growing practice in recent years.
From 2003 to 2007, the average repurchases per S&P 500 company
grew by more than four times-from $300 million on average in 2003 to
$1.2 billion in 2007.163 From 1997 through 2008, 438 companies on the
S&P 500 spent a total of $2.4 trillion on stock buybacks.'"
Issuers buy back their shares for a number of reasons, some of
which are positive, and some arguably not so positive for the overall
efficiency of the market. One positive reason behind buybacks is if a
company truly believes that its shares are undervalued and that the
expected returns on the buyback investment exceeds the expected
returns on an alternative investment. For example, in September 2011,
Berkshire Hathaway announced that it would buy back its own shares
for the first time in over forty years.165 The company released the fol-
lowing statement: "In the opinion of our board and management, the
underlying businesses of Berkshire are worth considerably more than
this amount, though any such estimate is necessarily imprecise.. .. If we
are correct in our opinion, repurchases will enhance the per-share intrin-
sic value of Berkshire shares."' 6 6 The share price of Berkshire Hathaway
surged by eight percent on the day the announcement was made. 6 1
Berkshire Hathaway's experience demonstrates that share repur-
chases often lead to a short-term increase in stock price. Access to this
tool by corporate managers can lead to moral hazard problems and deci-
162. Nelson D. Schwartz, As Layoffs Rise, Stock Buybacks Consume Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2011, at Al.
163. William Lazonick, How Stock Buybacks Strangle Innovation and Job Creation, NEXT
NEw DEAL: THE BLOG OF THE ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Jun. 30, 2011), http://www.nextnewdeal
.net/how-stock-buybacks-strangle-innovation-and-job-creation.
164. The Buyback Boondoggle, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.businessweek
.com/magazine/content/09_34/b4144096907029.htm.
165. Jason Zweig & Jonathan Cheng, Buffett Spots Fresh Bargain: Shares in His Own
Company, WALL ST. J., Sep. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020483130
4576594582853871222.html. Berkshire Hathaway repurchased shares valued at over $1.2 billion.
Kelly Scott, Warren Buffett Completes Buyback and Finds Berkshire Share Valuation Attractive,
CHAPWOOD FINANCE (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.chapwoodfinance.com/warren-buffett-com
pletes-buyback-and-finds-berkshire-share-valuation-attractive/.
166. Andrew Frye, Berkshire to Buyback Shares as Cash Tops $40B, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-26/berkshire-to-repurchase-shares-saying-
stock-is-undervalued.html.
167. Zweig & Cheng, supra note 165.
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sions that are suboptimal from a long-term growth and market efficiency
perspective. In the same 2000 letter to Berkshire Hathaway investors,
Buffett went on to state, "repurchases are all the rage, but are all too
often made for an unstated and, in our view, ignoble reason: to pump or
support the stock price."' 6 8 As the evidence below indicates, this can be
an effective way to combat short sales. Before exploring the effects
buybacks may have on short sales, however, it is important to under-
stand how buybacks can affect the performance of a stock's price and
metrics and the market as a whole.
Managers can use buyback programs to improve the metrics of a
stock that investors and analysts use to evaluate a firm. For example, if
an issuer buys back any of its shares, its "earnings per share" will auto-
matically increase. Earnings per share, calculated by dividing a com-
pany's net income by the average number of outstanding shares, is a
metric used to measure a company's profitability. By repurchasing
shares on the open market, the company is decreasing the number of
tradable shares, thereby increasing the earnings per share. 169 Analysts
often use the earnings per share metric when evaluating a stock and may
make "buy" recommendations when a company's earnings per share
improves. Additionally, earnings per share is sometimes a metric upon
which an executive's bonus is based. Charles Elson, the director of the
John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of
Delaware remarks that this kind of bonus structure is a "clear . . . con-
flict of interest" because "unless earnings per share are adjusted to
reflect the buyback, [the bonus] does not purely reflect performance."
In addition to improving earnings per share figures, when a com-
pany buys back its shares, it often causes the share price to increase for
multiple reasons. First, it "signals" to the market that the company
believes its share price is undervalued. Second, it decreases the supply
of tradable shares in the market. If demand stays constant, a decrease in
supply will lead to an increase in share price. Corporate managers have a
strong interest in keeping their stock price high. Over the past thirty
years, executive compensation in the form of stock options has risen
precipitously. In 1980, the average CEO received less than twenty per-
cent of her annual compensation in the form of stock options.170 Today,
the average value of annual stock options granted exceeds the average
CEO's salary and bonus combined.17 1 Volumes can be written about the
168. Buffett, supra note 161.
169. Earnings Per Share - EPS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eps.asp#
axzz2KchOOEhg (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
170. Andrew Balls, Executive Stock Options, NAT'L BUREAU OF EcON. RESEARCH, http://www
.nber.org/digest/dec98/w6674.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
171. Id.
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efficacy of performance-based compensation, but for the purposes of
this comment, it is important to simply understand that corporate execu-
tives have personal incentives to keep their company's stock price high.
At first blush, an inflated stock price seems beneficial to sharehold-
ers. But data shows that in the long run stock repurchases have detri-
mental effects on the value of a company.172 By using cash on hand to
purchase their own stock, companies are making the choice not to allo-
cate capital to improving their business. Harvard Business School pro-
fessor, and former Medtronic CEO, William W. George stated, "it's a
symptom of a deeper problem, which is a lack of investment in the long
term. If we're not investing in research, innovation and entrepreneur-
ship, we're going to be a slow-growth country for a decade."" There is
clear evidence of major companies investing in their own stock, rather
than the future of their own employees. In 2011, Pfizer laid off 1,100
employees and cut its research budget.174 In November of the same year,
Pfizer announced that it estimated to spend between $7 billion and $9
billion on stock buybacks that year."' In June 2011, Campbell Soup
announced plans to lay off 770 employees. Five days earlier, it
announced plans to repurchase $1 billion in stock.'7 1 Similarly, less than
three months after announcing a $10 billion share repurchase plan, Hew-
lett Packard eliminated 500 jobs in 201 1.' The outlook for the longer-
term success of companies that make these kinds of capital allocation
decisions is questionable. Research by Fortuna Advisors reinforces this
trend, showing that from 2001 through 2011 "companies that spent the
most on repurchases had a total shareholder return of 37% versus 127%
for companies that spent the least."17 1
Any market activity that may lead to increased share prices will
have a detrimental effect on short sales. On a daily basis, short sales are
tangentially affected by the decisions corporate managers make. The rel-
evant question for the purposes of this article is whether there is more
than just a tangential relationship between share repurchases and short
sales. A 2011 study by Texas A&M researchers Harrison Liu and
Edward P. Swanson suggests that there is."'
Liu and Swanson examined data on 4,081 firms from 2003 to 2009







179. Harrison Liu et al., Do Corporate Managers Trade Against Short Sellers (Sept. 1, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.con/abstract= 1899354.
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to determine "whether managers increase the amount of capital allocated
to repurchasing stock in order to counteract an increase in short inter-
est."s 0 The authors used publicly reported monthly short interest data
and quarterly share repurchase data. 8 ' They compared the change in
quarterly share repurchases to the change in quarterly short interest. 18 2
The authors found that "changes in corporate share repurchases are
strongly positively associated with contemporaneous changes in short
interest.""s' The data showed that for each one percent increase in short
interest, the quarterly share repurchases increased by $1,140,000.184 The
correlation between short interest and repurchases was shown to be as
strongly, and sometimes more strongly, correlated than a number of fac-
tors typically associated with repurchases, including stock performance,
available cash, and debt levels."8
One can infer that corporate managers use the short-term share
price increase that typically follows buybacks to squeeze short sellers.
This tactic may help the company's stock price in the short-term, but the
results seem to be negative in the long run. Research from the University
of Chicago's Owen Lamont shows that "when firms take anti-shorting
actions, their stock returns are extraordinarily low over the subsequent
months and years."1 86 Corporate managers might be aware of this corre-
lation, as evidenced by additional research Liu and Swanson conducted
on corporate managers' personal trades. Liu and Swanson analyzed the
relationship between corporate managers' personal insider trades and
short interest and share repurchase data. While presenting the paper to
American Accounting Association's annual meeting in 2011, Swanson
pointed out:
Managers may act in opposition to short-sellers with the company's
money, but, when their own money is at stake, their trades typically
are a reflection of short interest; in other words, at the same time that
they're buying shares with the company's money, they'll be selling
shares on their own account.... The dirty little secret that our study
uncovers is that corporate managers commonly use company money
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. ("One advantage of this design is that actions by managers and shorts that occur within
a relatively narrow time period (i.e., a quarter) are more likely to be causally related.").
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 5 ("This trading is unlikely to result from reverse causation whereby short sellers
react to corporate repurchases (i.e., endogeneity) because (1) short sellers have no incentive to
increase their position when a company is buying back its shares, and (2) information about
corporate share repurchases is reported quarterly, so it is not available to shorts in a timely
manner.").
185. Ben Haimowitz, Recap of Corporate Stock Repurchases Paper, AM. ACCOUNTING AsS'N,
http://aaahq.org/newsroom/CorporateStockRepurchases 10_9_11 .htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
186. Lamont, supra note 26, at 28.
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to fight short-sellers but are perfectly content to trade in concert with
them when the money comes out of their own pockets.187
The results of Liu's and Swanson's research suggest that corporate man-
agers use the short-term increase in stock price that typically follows a
stock buyback to squeeze short sellers.
B. Other Potentially Manipulative Issuer Actions
In addition to share repurchase programs, issuers use other poten-
tially manipulative practices to fight short sales. The primary practice
this comment addresses is when issuers manipulate the securities lend-
ing market for their shares. The following case study provides a good
illustration of this practice. Engineer John Rendall, founder of the com-
pany Solv-Ex, boasted in an advertisement for his company in the Wall
Street Journal: "You've probably never heard of us. You soon will
because our technology will reduce American dependence on Middle
East Oil."' Rendall founded Solv-Ex in 1980 "on the idea of develop-
ing a new technology to extract a tarlike-substance called bitumen from
tar sands."1 89 The idea was to further refine the bitumen into crude
oil.1 90 Solv-Ex raised "several million dollars" through a number of pri-
vate offerings and an initial public offering.'
Solv-Ex claimed in 1995 that the technology it created had allowed
it to develop "about four billion barrels of oil and one billion tons of
aluminum."' 92 Naturally, based on analysts' buy recommendations,
Solv-Ex's stock price began to rise. One of London's oldest investment
banks, Morgan Grenfell predicted, "Solv-Ex, between now [1995] and
2008, will be the fastest-growing oil company in the world."l 9 3
Some short sellers, however, did not believe the hype. Well-known
short seller, Manuel Asensio scrutinized the company. He went as far as
conducting interviews with employees and performing "aerial reconnais-
sance."l 9 4 Asensio's conclusion: Solv-Ex was "perhaps the greatest bliz-
zard of way-over-the-top pumpery I have ever witnessed."' 95
The analysts at Morgan Grenfell were wrong, and Asensio was cor-
rect. Solv-Ex's technology had never actually left the research and
187. Haimowitz, supra note 185.
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development stage.' 96 Solv-Ex had never produced any commercially
viable crude oil.'9 In July 1997, Solv-Ex was removed from the New
York Stock Exchange and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' 98
Solv-Ex successfully defrauded its long investors by using share-
holder letters. Solv-Ex also employed a letter to shareholders to manipu-
late the lending market for its shares to trigger a short squeeze.' 99 On
February 5, 1996, Solv-Ex faxed a letter to its shareholders and their
brokers that stated, "To help you control the value of your investment
... we suggest that you request delivery of the Solv-Ex certificates from
your broker as soon as possible." 2 00 The goal, which Solv-Ex achieved,
was to convince shareholders to remove their shares from the stock-
lending market. As previously discussed, when lenders recall their
shares, short sellers are obligated to deliver their borrowed shares back
to the lender, or alternatively, find new shares to borrow. In less than
twenty days, Solv-Ex's stock price surged by forty-two percent.201' By
constraining short sales, Solv-Ex had artificially inflated its stock price
above its fundamental value. But these fraudulent actions intended to
squeeze out shorts are not unique to Solv-Ex.
A similar event occurred in 2001, when the CEO of
GenesisIntermedia sent a letter to shareholders suggesting that they
reach out to their brokers and request that they move their shares of
GenesisIntermedia stock from their margin accounts to their cash
accounts.202 In part, the letter read, "if enough stock is taken out of street
name and margin accounts, short sellers will have difficulty maintaining
the current volume of short sales."203 In an interview with the L.A.
Times, Genesisintermedia's CFO stated:
I think that after our chairman sent out his letter, our shareholders
started to take possession of some of their shares, forcing the shorts
to cover their positions. . . . There also may be upward pressure on
the stock from people seeing the letter and then buying in anticipation
that the short squeeze will get more dramatic.204
In the thirty days following the letter, GenesisIntermedia's stock price
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Lamont, supra note 26, at 2.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. $24.875 on Feb. 2, 1996 to 35.375 on Feb. 21, 1996. Id.
202. Id. at 25.
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rose by thirty-nine percent, squeezing out numerous investors with short
positions in the process. 20 5
VII. PROPOSED REGULATORY CHANGES
A. Regulation of Issuers
The SEC must take a harder look at corporations when they repur-
chase shares or take actions that influence the lending market for their
shares. According to the SEC,
A fundamental goal of the federal securities laws is the prevention of
manipulation. Manipulation impedes the securities markets from
functioning as independent pricing mechanisms, and undermines the
integrity and fairness of those markets. Congress granted the Com-
mission broad rulemaking authority to combat manipulative abuses in
whatever form they might take.206
Recognizing the potential for "manipulative abuses" through share
repurchases, the SEC in 1982 adopted Rule lOb-18, which "provides a
voluntary 'safe harbor' from liability for manipulation" under Sections
9(a)(2),20 7 10(b), and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act").20 8
Rule 1 Ob- 18 provides four conditions the repurchases must meet in
order to fall within the safe harbor.209 First, the purchases must be con-
ducted through a single broker each day.210 Second, the purchase must
not be the opening transaction of the day, nor may the purchase take
place less than thirty minutes before the markets close. 2 11 Third, the
purchases must be at a price that "does not exceed the highest indepen-
dent bid or the last independent transaction price, whichever is higher,
quoted or reported . . . at the time the Rule lOb-18 purchase is
effected." 2 12 Fourth, an issuer may only purchase up to twenty-five per-
cent of the average daily trading volume of its shares.213
The SEC notes that even if an issuer's repurchases "technically sat-
205. Lamont, supra note 26, at 25.
206. SEC Final Rule Amending Regulation M, Release Nos. 33-7375; 34-38067, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-38067.txt.
207. 14 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 6852 ("Section 9(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
prohibits the manipulation of security prices through various sham transactions intended to induce
the purchase or sale of any registered security.")
208. SEC Division of Market Regulation, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning
Rule 10b-18 ("Safe Harbor" for Issuer Repurchases), SEC.Gov (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.sec
.gov/divisions/marketreg/rl0bl 8faq0504.htm.
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isfy" the Rule lOb-18 safe harbor conditions, the issuer may still violate
the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Exchange Act.
The safe harbor is not available if "the repurchases are made as part of a
manipulative scheme to influence the closing price of a company's
securities, or are done to mask other motives, such as inflating or
manipulating short-term earnings."214 When an issuer repurchases its
shares with the primary intent to prop up its stock price and squeeze
short sellers, it impedes the "securities markets from functioning as
independent price mechanisms." In its 2010 proposed rule to amend
Rule lOb-18,215 the SEC wrote, "Rule lOb-18's safe-harbor conditions
are designed to minimize the market impact of the issuer's repurchases,
thereby allowing the market to establish a security's price based on inde-
pendent market forces without undue influence by the issuer."216 It is
critical that the SEC abides by its words. When an issuer repurchases its
shares with the primary intent to combat short sales, it hinders the mar-
ket's ability to establish security prices in line with underlying funda-
mental values. Likewise, when an issuer artificially causes the lending
supply of its shares to be constrained, independent market forces are
unable to fairly affect share prices. The SEC's stated mission is "to pro-
tect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation."2 17 In pursuit of its mission, the SEC should more
closely scrutinize these manipulative practices.
B. Regulation of Brokerage Firms
The educated investor understands that a short sale is a risky invest-
ment. He understands that there is chance that the market might move
against him, that his borrowed shares may be recalled at any time, and
relatedly, that he may get caught in a short squeeze. Before he decides to
initiate the transaction, he will attempt to calculate the risk-adjusted
return of the short sale and compare it to available alternative invest-
ments. There are countless moving variables involved in the stock mar-
ket, and there is no way to account for all of them. However, the lending
supply of particular stocks is one important variable that short sellers
can use to better calculate the riskiness of their potential investments.
Brokerage firms have access to this information, but are not currently
214. Supra note 208.
215. The amendments were promulgated to clarify and modernize the safe harbor provisions.
Proposed Rule Amending Rule lOb-18, Release No. 34-61414, 2010, available at http://www.sec
.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-61414.pdf.
216. Id.
217. SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo
.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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required to disclose it. This information will not reduce the "risks" asso-
ciated with short sales, but it will reduce some of the "uncertainty." The
likely result will be an increase in the number of informed short sales in
the market.
University of Chicago economist Frank Knight21 8 is best known for
his 1921 book, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, in which he theorizes
about the distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty."21 9 According to
Knight, risk applies to situations where the ultimate outcome is
unknown, but one can accurately measure the odds of an outcome occur-
ring. Uncertainty, on the other hand, applies to situations where one does
not possess sufficient information to accurately predict the odds to begin
with.220
The relevance of this distinction to short sales is that Knightian
uncertainty may lead to non-participation. An uncertainty-averse inves-
tor will allocate more of his capital into an investment that possesses a
"distribution of returns he is more confident" about.2 2 1 Peter Dizikes of
MIT News explains this theory in the context of financial firms:
Investment banks that in recent years regarded their own apparently
precise risk assessments as trustworthy may have thought they were
operating in conditions of Knightian risk, where they could judge the
odds of future outcomes. Once the banks recognized those assess-
ments were inadequate, however, they understood that they were
operating in conditions of Knightian uncertainty-and may have held
back from making trades or providing capital, further slowing the
economy as a result.2 2 2
Empirical evidence shows that short sales play an important role in the
market. To reduce the number of informed short sellers that choose not
to participate in the market, this comment recommends requiring broker-
age firms to disclose information that will mitigate some of the uncer-
tainty that surrounds share recalls.
FINRA should require that brokerage firms disclose to their clients,
on a dynamic basis, the number of lendable shares the firm has available
of a particular security. In a survey of five online brokerage firms, only
218. Frank Knight served as George Stigler's thesis advisor at University of Chicago. George
Stigler, Autobiography, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/
laureates/1982/stigler-bio.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
219. Peter Dizikes, Explained: Knightian Uncertainty, MITNEWs (June 1, 2010), http://web
.mit.edulnewsoffice/2010/explained-knightian-0602.html.
220. Id.
221. Astrid V. Schomick, Irrelevance of Short Sale Constraints Under Ambiguity Aversion 3
(Aug. 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=676648.
222. Dizikes, supra note 219.
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one firm discloses this information to its clients.22 3 The four surveyed
firms that do not disclose this information 2 24 are the four largest online
brokerage firms by number of clients.22 5 This is important information
for an investor because recall risk is negatively correlated with loan
supply.
Along similar lines, if a brokerage firm does not have in its own
supply shares available to lend, the firm will often borrow the shares
from a third-party securities lender. As discussed in Section IV, if there
is limited lending supply, the security is considered "hard to borrow."
Brokerage firms should be required to disclose to their clients whether
the shares they deliver to the short seller come from their own supply or
a third party and whether the shares were considered "hard to borrow."
This information will reduce the uncertainty associated with short sales
and hopefully encourage informed investors to participate in the short
sale market.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Short sales have remained controversial since the formation of the
first publicly traded company over 400 years ago. However, there should
be no debate over the importance of short sales. Short sales play a criti-
cal role in the market because, as the empirical data concludes, they
bring valuable information to the market, drive prices closer to funda-
mental reality, and lower the costs of trading. Regulators should take
steps to better protect short sales by actively scrutinizing potential
manipulative practices of issuers, and by requiring brokerage firms to
increase informational disclosures.
223. Interactive Brokers discloses this information via its "Short Stocks Availability Tool."
Telephone interview with Interactive Brokers Broker (Feb. 8, 2013).
224. TD Ameritrade, Charles Schwab, E*Trade, and Scottrade. Telephone Interviews with
Brokers from TD Ameritrade, Charles Schwab, E*Trade, and Scottrade (Feb. 8, 2013).
225. Largest Online Brokerage Firms in US. Biggest Stock Broker Companies in 2013,
BROKERAGEREViEW, http://www.brokerage-review.com/stock-brokers/largest-brokerage-firms
.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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